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MONIT CONCEPTUAL PAPER1
 
MONIT CENTRAL GOALS  
OECD is known for its recent engagement in analysing and benchmarking innovation policies 
in OECD member countries. It has played a substantial role in identifying new avenues in 
innovation policy thinking, in particular through its project on National Innovation Systems 
(see OECD, 2001a; OECD, 2001b; OECD 2001c; OECD, 2002). The NIS project in OECD 
has over the years turned out a number of useful policy implications, many of which have 
found breeding ground in various OECD-member states policy systems. In the Netherlands 
for example the notion of Dynamic Innovation System which is used as a framework for 
developing innovation policies further was to an important degree inspired by the OECD NIS 
project. [add other examples, PdH]. OECD through this NIS-project helped in defining and 
analysing what has been labelled as the systemic (policy) approach to innovation in an 
innovation-driven economic environment.  
 
Why then an OECD project on “Monitoring and Implementing Horizontal Innovation Policy” 
(MONIT) one could ask? MONIT has been put in place as the overall feeling is that although 
the need for a systemic approach to innovation and to innovation policy is no longer 
questioned (there is more than market failure), putting the notion of systemic innovation 
policy-making into practice is far from easy. Further, MONIT acknowledges that innovation 
does not only play a role in enhancing competitiveness  and furthering economic growth but 
plays a role in dynamising other sectoral policy domains (e.g. environment, health) as well.  
In these other domains, innovation policies have contributed to solving societal issues (ref. the 
distinction between primary and secondary impacts), but this has not always been recognised 
by those involved in STI-policy-making (including a lot of analysts). MONIT then basically 
questions simple market failure thinking (systemic innovation policies work through various 
direct and indirect mechanisms to further innovation) and broadens its scope in terms of 
sectoral policy domains. Put differently (and maybe a bit simplistic), MONIT will have to 
deal with two challenges:  
 
 how to make innovation policy from a  fragmented into an (integrated) multisectoral 
innovation policy; 
 how to  evolve from a single goal into a multi-goal innovation policy 
 
In MONIT we will have to analyse and illustrate how (i.e. through studying policy processes) 
innovation policies can be transformed from a basically sectoral policy covering the domain 
of facilitating (technological) innovation to increase economic growth and competitiveness 
into a more systemic (and coordinated, or integrated, or horizontalised) policy where 
innovation is not only covering the domain of supporting innovation in the economic realm 
but contributes to solving societal problems more widely. In the matrix below this is 
illustrated again quite simplistic, maybe we need an extra dimension i.e. the sort of policy 
                                                          
1 This paper is a draft version of a joint conceptual paper for the OECD/TIP MONIT study. It is still a work in 
progress and will serve the two purposes of guiding the work of the MONIT network according to the workplan 
as well as serve as a learning medium in which lessons from the MONIT activities are fed back into this paper. 
As such, it will be a vehicle towards the Work Package 3 in which the MONIT study is summed up and 
synthesised. The paper has so far benefitted from contributions by Pim den Hertog, Patries Boekholt, Thomas 
Halvorsen, Rannveig Røste and Svend Remoe. The latter has also edited the contributions into one paper. 
instruments/mechanisms. 
 
 
                       DOMAINS 
GOALS 
Sectoral innovation policy Multi-sectoral innovation 
policy 
Innovation policy in a 
limited sense i.e. aimed 
primarily at innovating 
(ultimately) industry and 
economic growth 
Innovation policy in a limited 
sense (basically technology 
and industrial policies)  
Integrated STI policies 
Innovation policy in a wider 
sense i.e. aimed at 
(ultimately) economic 
growth and  
Quality of life 
Innovation policies in other 
sectoral domains e.g. 
innovation policies in health, 
innovation policies in the 
environment  
Horizontal / comprehensive / 
integrated or coherent / 
systemic innovation policies 
 
The MONIT project in our view is exactly about the policy processes that contribute to the 
shaping of horizontal, comprehensive and coherent innovation policies. Key issues are such as 
policy mix, policy co-ordination, innovation governance and policy learning. The innovation 
policy-mix as used in certain NIS already indicates how broad innovation policies are defined. 
However, we must also look behind this policy mix and see how this policy mix has come 
into being and this is mostly the result of how innovation is governed in a certain NIS.  
 
As said, we see the coming about of certain innovation policy mixes in a national innovation 
system, innovation governance (especially processes of “horizontalisation”) and policy 
learning as key notions. Through MONIT we aim at understanding – basically through 
analysing policy processes – the following: 
 
 how has a certain innovation policy mix evolved as an answer to what are perceived as the 
central problems in a certain national innovation system (and where is the particular 
country on the scale from ‘limited innovation policies’ towards ‘horizontal systemic 
innovation policies’); 
 what are the key characteristics of the specific innovation governance in this innovation 
system (especially aspects of governance that deal with horizontalisation of innovation 
policies); and, 
 in what way are processes of policy learning brought about and which tools are used in 
this process (again in the process of getting from ‘limited innovation policies’ towards 
‘horizontal systemic innovation policies’); 
 [ultimately: how can in a specific NIS a coherent and appropriate innovation policy mix or 
policy portfolio be put in place]2 
 
                                                          
2  I found article by Ken Guy and Claire Nauwelaers in IPTS-report, no. 71, p. 20-28, quite helpful e.g. 
“…if STI policies are to be fine-tuned to the needs of a particular innovation system, better linkages are needed 
between this and other policy spheres, notably those of industrial and business development and education and 
training. The adequacy of such links – often exacerbated by ministrial ‘turf wars’ – can be approved across the 
European Union, and network failures of this nature in the policy-making sphere constitute a further challenge to 
the development of systemic STI policies” (p. 25) 
 
We do acknowledge that national innovation systems are inherently different in terms of 
history, specialisation, structural set up, agenda setting, interaction between actors, 
(perceived) dominant problems, policy culture and so on. We therefore can map good 
practices, but some will be transferable, others are custom made and cannot be transplanted 
easily. Identifying what is and what is not transferable is part of goal of the project. [This is 
obviously the point that Jari has stressed several times already and what in fact can be labelled 
as ‘intelligent benchmarking’ or ‘intelligent policy learning’, PdH] 
 
Coherence – the ultimate goal of horizontal innovation policy 
Horizontalization is not a goal in itself, but rather a characteristic of a policy system. It could 
be defined as the degree to which (in this case) innovation policy is guided by a 
comprehensive national strategy in which contributions from the various sectors are linked to 
achieve policy coherence. Hence, the link between horizontalization and the arrangements for 
co-ordination and governance is a crucial one. 
 
Hence, it is the national capabilities of national policy systems to generate coherent 
innovation policy that is at stake. Coherence is important for many reasons:3
 
• Coherent policies are more likely to be effective and more readily applied in a consistent 
and equitable way; 
• Governments are increasingly faced with complex and difficult issues, which may impact 
differently on different areas of society; 
• They frequently have a range of objectives which cannot easily be reconsiled and may be 
in conflict; 
• Faced with greater accountability and challenge, through parliaments, civil society and the 
media, lack of coherence becomes readily apparent and results in uncertainty loss of 
confidence.  
 
The concept has basically three dimensions: 
 
• Horisontal coherence ensuring that individual, or sectoral, policies, build on each other 
and minimises inconsistencies in the case of (seemingly) conflicting goals; 
• Vertical coherence ensuring that public outputs are consistent with the original intentions 
of policy makers; 
• Temporal coherence ensuring that todays policies continue to be effective in the future by 
limiting potential incoherence and providing guidance for change (and relates to transition 
management). 
 
The MONIT study therefore aims at generating lessons for national governments on how to 
achieve coherence in innovation policy by highlighting issues like political leadership, 
building effective co-ordination mechanisms, socio-policical foundations for information 
exchange and policy learning, cultural factors in policy systems and related sources for 
coherent policy making. 4  
                                                          
3 From a discussion paper for the Centre of Government Network: Government Coherence: The Role of the 
Centre, OECD, PUMA.  
4 See appendix for a list of tools that may enhance policy coherence. This list, derived from the above OECD 
paper, serves only as a point of departure. It is the aim of MONIT to expand and develop this into instructive 
lessons for member countries. 
 
Key elements in policy profiling5 [not exhaustive] 
 
Shape of a NIS and innovation policy mixes as inheritances from the past 
The actual form and operation of a certain NIS and the policy mixes used are to an important 
extend inheritances from past innovation governance and innovation performance. In the 
Netherlands for example already in the 1930s TNOs and the GTIs were established to solve 
the gap between science and practical application. Up till today these institutions are part of 
the Dutch innovation system. The Industry Science Relationships are still on the policy 
agenda, but the sheer existence of TNO and the GTI influences the sort of solutions proposed. 
Similarly, the quite early dominance of a few technology oriented manufacturing 
multinationals – also in the governance of the innovation system – made that an innovation 
system emerged that for a long time was well suited to their particular needs. However, the 
Netherlands are still experiencing a lack of fast growing innovative start ups that is at least 
related to the dominance of these firms in the innovation governance. This has also leaded to 
discussions on how research agenda’s are built, who is consulted, who has an impact, etc. 
These two examples show how history matters in the shaping of NIS, the dominant policy 
designs that emerge and the sort of innovation governance that is typical for a certain NIS. 
The MONIT-project should help in understanding what is defined as the dominant policy 
challenge that innovation policy should help to solve and how certain policy mixes come into 
being. This points at the need for innovation policy profiling, understanding what are 
perceived as the major problems to be solved by innovation policy and also at the need to 
understand the history behind a certain innovation policy mix. [Mapping the current  
innovation policy mix, what are perceived to be the central barriers in a given NIS and 
indications of horizontalisation are dealt with in WP 1, part A] 
 
Innovation governance is more than setting in place the right institutions 
MONIT is about innovation governance. Innovation governance is not simply about top down 
designing an innovation strategy, putting in place the right institutions and then subsequently 
implementing it. As Kuhlman (2002, p. 25) observed: “Policy-making is only seldom a matter 
of top-down decision-making and straight-forward implementation; rather it can be modelled 
as a process of competition, networking and attempts at consensus-building between 
heterogeneous (corporatist) actors representing different societal subsystems. Frequently, 
policy decisions are negotiated in multi-actor arenas and related networks which may stretch 
over multi-level politico-administrative systems”. As more straightforwardly put by 
Technopolis (2002) innovation governance is about the “interplay between the various actors 
that together determine the priorities, strategies, activities and outcomes in innovation” 
(Technopolis, 2002). This already hints at the fact that describing and analysing governance in 
a given NIS would require looking into aspects such as (possibly a selection thereof): 
 
• institutional set up i.e. formal decision-making and responsibilities  
• accountability (goal setting, evaluation, impact measurement)  
• processes of agenda setting and prioritization   
• inter-institutional coordination and integration (‘horizontalisation’) 
• actor involvement 
• coordination of the various policy levels (national – EU, national-regional) 
 
                                                          
5 The following relates primarily to WP1. 
[WP 1, Part B will focus on describing and analysing governance in a given innovation 
system. The exact aspects of innovation governance that we will look at needs to be decided 
on in the MONIT steering committee, but it is evident that the number of aspects needs to be 
limited to keep the workload within limits.] 
 
Horizontalisation is key element of the development towards systemic innovation policies 
Innovation policy is not a sectoral policy domain. Innovations can be useful to solve all sorts 
of societal problems in addition to playing a key role in processes of economic growth. 
Innovation is therefore relevant in all sorts of policy domains, but as a means rather than as a 
goal in itself. Modern innovation policy-making is about facilitating innovation in all 
domains. This first requires the opening up of the narrowly defined innovation policies (such 
as Science, Technology and Industrial policies) to include at first all sorts of framework 
policies that are important for realising innovation (such as competition, education, labour 
market and financial policies). Second, in a next phase, it is about looking in what way 
innovation is taken care of in more sectoral policy areas already. Although supporting 
innovation is maybe not their first aim, these policies could be integrated more with STI 
policies as to develop eventually more comprehensive and coherent innovation policies. 
These more sectoral policy domains include such areas as the environment, health, defence 
and so on in which innovation is not a prime policy concern, but in which a well thought 
through innovation strategy could help in solving the sort of problems addressed in these 
policy domains. [the aspect of horizontalisation part of WP 1 part A, B and C] 
 
 
[Question: do we have to more explicitly make a distinction between horizontalisation in 
goals and horizontalisation in sectoral policy domains? To what extent os horizontalisation a 
goal in itself? Are there topical domains that by definition have their own governance 
structures and that we should try to integrate with the ‘logic’ of STI-based innovation 
policies?] 
 
MONIT is about formal and informal policy co-ordination processes  
In the overall synthesis of the preceding phase of the OECD NIS project it was concluded that  
“policy co-ordination is not a top-down process since the “components of co-ordination 
capacity are cumulative in the sense that higher level co-ordination functions depend on the 
existence and reliability of the lower one” (Metcalfe, 1994). Implementing an integrated 
innovation policy requires concerted efforts at many levels in many different organisations, 
including interfaces with the business sector and society at large, which together constitute the 
governance structure of the national innovation system” (OECD, 2002, p. 72). Interestingly a 
policy co-ordination scale is introduced ranging from independent decision-making by 
individual ministries (i.e. lowest level of coordination) through various forms of consultation 
and joint priority setting to an government strategy (i.e. highest level of coordination). A 
policy-co-ordination as this – which may be adjusted to the particular needs of the MONIT 
participants – in our view would be helpful in mapping and analyzing the innovation policy 
processes. [especially in WP parts B and possibly part C we will have to deal with this aspect] 
 
MONIT is about processes of policy learning 
Innovation scholars increasingly stress the importance of policy learning and systematic 
evaluations and policy experiments. OECD (2002, p. 75) for example observed that “Policy 
learning through cycles of experimentation, evaluation and adaptation of objectives and 
instruments is key to long term success…Policy learning rests on three pillars: participatory 
and non-bureaucratic policy processes; evaluation and “economic intelligence”. Governments 
need to engage in continuous interactions in knowledge networks, building on complementary 
institutions and private partners. Innovation policies and their combined effects should be 
both monitored to provide real time learning and evaluation to secure learning and reflection 
for ministries, agencies, and private sector organizations concerned”. In the Dutch context 
CPB (2001, p. 196, p. 212, p. 232) noted that on many themes uncertainty is prevalent and a 
plea is made for policy learning and room for experiments (e.g. within schemes such as 
WBSO) in combination with serious policy evaluations in both generic and specific policy 
schemes as to further the knowledge on the efficacy of innovation policy. 
  
MONIT in our view not only offers a good opportunity to compare innovation governance 
structures, but also offers a fine opportunity to see how policy learning and unlearning6 is 
organized in the various participating countries through various means such as policy 
monitoring and evaluation7 and benchmarking (including an intelligence function). [WP 1, 
Part C deals more in detail with the topic of policy learning.] 
 
Intelligent benchmarking 
What practices are transferable and what practices are culture/context or country specific 
(third point in mail Jari dd. 21/02/2003). See also, article by Soete, IPTS report no 71, p. 9 
PM 
 
Additional items that could be developed: 
Technological and non-technological innovation (including renewal of institutions?) 
PM 
 
Differentiate between strategic intelligence, Policy capability and policy implementation?  
PM, see e.g. October note Jari & Pentti on this. 
 
Differentiate between various type of failure (rationale for systemic policies) 
PM, here I found the 5 categories as mentioned by O’Doherty and Arnold (IPTS-report, no. 
71, p. 32, see also IRCE-report) useful, differentiation between market, capability, 
institutional, network and framework failures. 
 
 
 
INNOVATION POLICY SPACE [AN ATTEMPT] 
At the risk of introducing yet another unspecific notion8 we will introduce and outline the 
notion of ‘innovation policy space’ here somewhat. In general the idea stemming from a 
                                                          
6 Unlearning and being prepared to timely abolish innovation schemes is as much part of policy learning as 
introducing new and improved schemes. In fact the additionality of each scheme needs to be checked for, a 
practice which is for instance quite common in Finland. 
7 There is an established monitoring and evaluation research tradition and community of evaluation experts. 
Some countries also have a well developed evaluation tradition. Recently Technopolis in an international 
benchmark study looked into evaluation procedures in several countries (2001). They for example listed the 
various methods used to evaluate the effectiveness of policies as practiced in 10 countries and at the European 
Commission (2001, p. 13). 
8  We are using phrases like innovation system, policy learning, strategic intelligence, innovation 
governance, horizontalisation of innovation policies, innovation policy space, etc. We should be weary not to 
introduce and use too many concepts at the same time as this makes it more and more difficult to convey our 
messages to the normal world of policy-makers and even fellow scholars.  
systemic approach to innovation is that not only a series of interdependent actors are involved 
in the process of innovation, but also that there are various levers that can be pulled by policy-
makers (as well as by other actors involved in the act of innovation) to facilitate the process of 
innovation. Certainly if we add to the argument of market failures the various other types of 
failures9 that might be a rationale for policy intervention.  Policy intervention does sound 
quite heavy (interventionist), but it is in practice a continuum from various direct and indirect 
forms of intervention ranging from direct support to individual actors (e.g. R&D support) to 
all sorts of more indirect forms of intervention10 such as taking care of certain framework 
conditions or even the use of ‘non-innovation policies’ that may in one way or the other affect 
processes of innovation (or for that matter processes of knowledge production, diffusion and 
use).   
 
How much room to manoeuvre is there to influence (conditions for) or govern innovation? 
One of the key ideas in MONIT is that there is in practice much more room to influence the 
act of innovation than some are prepared to think. This room or space can be defined as 
‘innovation policy space’ and depending on the particular case this innovation policy space 
will look differently as history, institutionalisation, economic specialisation, culture, 
governance tradition, policy mix etc. is different. The notion of innovation policy space might 
be useful in mapping differences in the policy mix and policy approaches to innovation 
between various countries or regions. One could think of four dimensions that together define 
the innovation policy space or realm where policy can influence the act of innovation, these 
are: 
 
1. Dimension 1: aspects of governance/variety in possible policy roles  
[“aspects on which innovation is steered or characteristics of policy processes”]  
This dimension points at the multiple ways in which innovation policy processes can be 
steered ranging from putting in place new (innovation) institutions, help building (innovation) 
agenda’s, making sure the various policy levels are co-ordinated, involve various actors in the 
process of innovation, making sure government involvement can be accounted for etc.  It is 
increasingly acknowledged, not least in innovation system approaches that apart from 
financing certain actors or facilities, policy-makers play a role in such processes as building 
an innovation agenda, making sure the institutional context is in tune with the needs of a 
particular set of actors or bringing together certain actors. In practice these policy processes 
can be both formal and informal policy processes. Innovation governance as outlined here is 
one of the three key analytical dimensions in the MONIT project (see also the vertical axis in 
figures 1 and 2 below).  
 
2. Dimension 2: Policy domains 
 [“Areas from which policy processes that affect innovation may originate”] 
The policy-domains are one of the key dimensions in the MONIT-project as the general idea 
is that innovation is not confined to the area of STI-policies. Other ‘non-innovation policy 
domaines’ may influence processes of innovation in basically two ways:  
(a) these non-innovation policy domains provide inputs or affect certain conditions that are 
                                                          
9  A fine taxonomy might be the one as proposed by O’Doherty and Arnold i.e. market, capability, 
institutional, network and framework failures. 
10  In the STI sphere Ken Guy and Claire Nauwelaers have provided a fine overview of STI policies that fit 
nicely with the NIS-notion (IPTS-report, no. 71, p. 23). 
important for innovation to take place (e.g. the need for a well trained workforce, a judicial 
framework that facilitates and not stifles innovation); 
(b) innovation takes place in these policy domains themselves and innovation can be a help 
here in solving certain societal problem (e.g. in healthcare there is a need for innovation in the 
organization of the system as a whole).   
The MONIT-project explicitly deals with these processes of horizontalisation of innovation 
policy. In work package 1 as defined in the December MONIT-paper mapping and analysis of 
horizontalisation starts from the narrowly defined innovation policy-making, whereas the 
foreseen case studies in work package 2 illustrate how innovation is governed in more 
sectoral policy domains. The policy domains dimensions is given as the vertical axis in 
figures 1 and 2 below). 
 
3. Dimension 3: Levels of policy coordination 
 [“Degrees of co-ordination in innovation policy processes] 
Quite a number of policy actors can be involved in innovation policy. Their activities can take 
place independently or can be co-ordinated to varying degrees. In mapping the policy space it 
might be good to identify to what extent these policy actions (or institutions) are coordinated 
or not. As mentioned above a policy co-ordination scale can be introduced ranging from 
independent decision-making by individual ministries (i.e. lowest level of coordination) 
through various forms of consultation and joint priority setting to an government strategy (i.e. 
highest level of coordination). This dimension is given as the third dimension in figure 1 
below. 
 
4. Dimension 4: Stages in the policy life cycle 
 [policy processes are different in the various stages of the policy cycle and differ in  
 their level of concreteness and an iteration might result in policy learning] .  
Generally some sort of a policy cycle is used to differentiate between the various stages that 
can be discerned in policy processes. Generally a differentiation is made between an 
analytical or strategic intelligence stage that precedes, the stage of setting the policy agenda, 
which should then be followed by a translation into concrete policy measures. These might be 
followed by some form of monitoring and evaluation which then feeds into a new policy 
iteration in which the lessons from the previous one are (or sometimes not) used. In between 
processes of benchmarking might be used to see whether other NIS perform better or dispose 
of policy processes that might be transferred to the particular NIS. This dimension is given as 
the third dimension in figure 2 below.  
 
 
Figure 1:  Conceptual framework for analysing innovation policy processes in MONIT  
[dimension 1, 2 and 3] 
 
 
 
Figure 2:  Conceptual framework for analysing innovation policy processes in MONIT  
[dimension 1, 2 and 4] 
 
 
 
Either one of these two (or both) can be used to map and visualise how innovation policy is 
positioned in the various NIS or has evolved over the years. The notion of innovation policy 
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space can even be visualised by indicating how many blocks it covers or by indicating where 
particular problems arise in formulating or implementing innovation policies.  
 
In the Steering committee meeting in Helsinki, it was agreed to use the following set of policy 
dimensions for the profiling of national innovation policies: 
 
 
 
Innovation Governance 
Why is Innovation Governance important? 
 
In the last two decades we have witnessed an evolutionary learning process in the thinking 
about innovation and innovation policy. Gradually the concept of  ‘innovation systems’ has 
established a position on the policy agenda’s of many OECD countries. The interactive and 
systemic approach pays much more attention to multiple sources of new ideas and knowledge 
creation, to the bridges and linkages of various actors in the system, to widening the ‘pipeline 
perspective’ of innovation than was common in the linear innovation approaches. This insight 
has induced a gradual process of reshaping the system and rethinking the role of public and 
private actors in this system.   
 
With a good two decades of experience in innovation policy and an even much longer history 
in science, technology and industry policy, most OECD countries have built up an extensive 
institutional structure dealing with innovation.  The way in which science and innovation are 
organised in a country shows a historical path dependency, giving each country a relatively 
unique governance structure.  This has led policy analysts still to think in terms of national 
(or regional) systems of innovation, despite the fierce developments of globalisation and 
international political integration that also have taken place.   
 
In parallel, recently an increasing number of actors outside and inside the innovation system 
(parliaments, government auditors, business associations,  political parties), are demanding 
evidence of the effectiveness of all these innovation policies.   
 
It is evident that some countries, more than others, are successful in shifting from traditional 
and mature economic activities to knowledge intensive industries and services, in raising the 
R&D intensity of their firms and in harbouring new growth industries. While the policy 
community has been active to disseminate ‘good practice’ policy practices and instruments in 
the 1990s, we have also witnessed limitations to the transferability of these good practices due 
to the differences in the institutional set ups between countries and regions. This raises an 
important question: in how far is this difference in ability to make these transitions linked to 
the way science and innovation are governed?  Are some governance structures better 
equipped to stimulate and channel this transition?  Could governance structures form an 
obstacle to this transition? The question how the governance of the innovation system affects 
the success in creating both economic growth and a good quality of life is therefore crucial for 
future policy strategies. 
What are the key issues? 
 
The objective of MONIT is to help TIP learn from national efforts to develop national 
capabilities for innovation policy governance. More precisely, this will involve drawing 
lessons from selected national experiences to improve the understanding of: 
a) How path dependencies from national traditions generate and sustain policy mixes. 
b) How different policies interact to create a basis for developing horizontal policy.  
c) How to co-ordinate policies across institutional boundaries through inter-ministerial. 
collaboration and institutional mechanisms for policy learning within and between 
agencies and ministries. 
d) The key national capabilities for effective processes of policy formulation, co-ordination 
and implementation as well as for the management of transition processes in complex 
innovation systems. These capabilities include those of evaluation and identifying policy 
needs. 
 
The term governance is a widely used and therefore not very precisely defined concept. In 
public management literature, the term governance “ … is a perspective within which the 
conventional boundaries between politics and administration are perhaps less significant, and 
which enables large social questions to be approached more directly than from within the 
narrower perspective of traditional public administration”.  These are linked with systems 
approaches where “the boundaries between individual institutions become less significant 
than the question of how the whole ensemble dances (or fails to dance) together.”11 The 
European Commission  published a White Paper on the subject of governance which “… 
concerns the way in which the Union uses the powers given by its citizens.” 12  The definition 
of the term in this White Paper  is as follows:  
 
“‘Governance’ means rules, processes and behaviour that affect the way in which 
powers are exercised at European level, particularly as regards openness, 
participation, accountability, effectiveness and coherence.”   
 
The key to using the concept is that it focuses on policy processes rather than on the outcome 
in terms of policy instruments, institutional actors, financial resources etc.  Rather than 
creating a static picture of the innovation system or the set of policy instruments, looking at 
governance means looking at the dynamics of the system, those aspects which allow 
innovation systems to change and to adapt.  
 
Governance mechanisms should fulfil a number of functions in the innovation system13
• Agenda setting: deciding the scope of actions the state and the publicly funded actors in 
innovation and research should take 
• Prioritisation: deciding which of these actions are most necessary in the context of scarce 
government resources 
• Learning and adapting to change 
                                                          
11  Pollitt, C., Bouckaert, G., Public Management Reform, A comparative analysis, Oxford University 
Press, 2000.  
12  Commission of the European Communities, COM (2001) 428 final, Brussels, 25.7.2001.  
13  This section draws heavily upon  Boekholt, Arnold, et al; The Governance of Research and Innovation, 
An international Comparative Study, Report for the Netherland’s Ministry of Economic Affairs, Technopolis, 
2002 
• Effective implementation of the actions taken 
 
A recent empirical study compared Research and Innovation Governance practices in Canada, 
Denmark, Finland, Ireland, the Netherlands, Norway, Sweden and the UK.14 The study found 
that many countries are struggling with similar governance issues.  A critical one is how to 
arrive at a coherent science, technology and innovation (STI) policy. The study identified the 
need for greater coherence and integration along three dimensions: 
 
• The integration of knowledge creation (mostly basic research) and the use of knowledge 
for commercial exploitation, thus better integration of science and innovation policies. 
• The co-ordination and attuning of different societal and economic goals of research and 
innovation, thus integrating STI policies across sectoral departments.  
• The combination of knowledge from different science disciplines to tackle 
interdisciplinary research needs (e.g. bio-technology) and overarching societal problems 
that need such an interdisciplinary approach (e.g. climate change). 
 
Other typical STI governance issues are: 
• How does the governance structure deal with adaptation and change in the innovation 
system? What brings about change in structure and public investments in STI ? 
• How are research performers (universities and public research organisations) and 
intermediaries (funding agencies) held accountable for their activities?   
• How do national and regional actors co-ordinate their activities?  
 
These form a combination of horizontal co-ordination issues (between policy domains, and 
across traditional scientific and technological boundaries) and vertical co-ordination issues 
(between political agenda setting, policy formulation, design and implementation).  In 
MONIT the emphasis will primarily be on horizontal co-ordination issues, and on broadening 
the scope to policy domains outside the core science, technology and innovation policy 
arenas.  Horizontalisation is not a goal in itself but a possible solution to: 
 
• Avoid that policy instruments developed in one domain are not off-set or made ineffective 
by those in another domain ( or in a more positive sense: reinforce the effect of policies in 
one area by developing accompanying measures in another area) 
• Tackle societal issues with potentially conflicting objectives, e.g. economic growth and 
sustainable development, entrepreneurship and labour policies, … 
• Tackle societal issues that are too broad and complex to deal with from one or separate 
policy angles (mobility) 
 
In addition to governance issues related to co-ordination, important aspects of governance to 
understand are also how priorities are set in the system, what stakeholders have an impact 
on this (and how are they consulted), how policy learning takes place (through formal routes 
such as policy planning tools, monitoring and evaluation, or more informal channels).  The 
latter also includes how parts of the system are abolished.  
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How could MONIT contribute to the advancement in understanding and policy 
making? 
 
 
Within the MONIT project innovation governance is closely linked to the description of 
policy profiles  (WP1-A) on the one hand and the analysis of policy learning (WP1-C) on the 
other, as well as the study of interaction, integration and learning in the various policy studies 
in WP2. 
 
The focus in MONIT is on four dimensions of the national capabilities to manage coherent 
and adaptive innovation policy: 
 
• Policy analysis and evaluation 
• Agenda setting and prioritization 
• Implementation 
• Transition management 
 
Transition management is here understood as the ways in which more complex changes are 
managed through comprehensive policy packages and their strategic implementation. This 
includes the ways through which innovation policy institutions learn and the ways in which 
governance structures renew themselves. 
 
More specifically the tasks that could be performed in MONIT are: 
• A deepening of the analytical discussion of governance and the key issues involved 
• Defining the ‘policy space’ that we are going to cover collectively, allowing for different 
emphases in each country 
• A mapping of institutional actors in each country and a comparison with other MONIT 
countries 
• An overview of the main ‘rules of the game’, how these actors report to and interact with 
each other, what co-ordination mechanisms exist on several levels. The focus is on 
governance issues such as horizontal co-ordination, accountability, priority and agenda-
setting, evaluation and learning. 
• Some indicators of ‘good practice’ and success in governance including an assessment of 
performance of each of the countries  
 
First suggestions for an approach 
 
Governance is more than the official structures of organisations, the rules and procedures that 
formalise the relations between those organisations and the official mandates they are given. 
Understanding governance also means understanding the informal processes, the power 
relations between organisations, the personal relations and positions taken in the networks of 
organisations, in short the ‘informal glue’ that either makes the innovation system move 
smoothly or makes it sticky.   
 
Thus a deep understanding of governance needs a mix of approaches and methodologies.  
Very roughly we suggest that the following types of research activities need to be performed 
in the course of Work Package 1B: 
 
• Mapping of the actors involved in the core of Science, Technology and Innovation (STI) 
policy and their formal relations 
• Mapping of other major policy actors who directly or indirectly determine the STI policy 
space 
• Mapping of major policy actors who use or could use STI for solving societal problems 
• Desk research to make a first description of missions, activities, resources and the role of 
STI in these missions 
• Description of co-ordination failures and governance tools or arrangements in each policy 
system 
• Face-to-face interviews with key people to develop a deeper understanding of informal 
and informal co-ordination processes, power relations, stakeholder influence, priority 
setting and general policy planning mechanisms 
• Workshops with policy actors and stakeholders to discuss findings 
 
Depending on the scope of governance issues that each country team chooses and the person-
power that each team can spend on MONIT, the kick-off workshop can help to define the 
‘minimal core’ of research activities regarding both to the ‘policy space’ we aim at and 
particular governance issues on which we need a minimum understanding.   
 
Given the ‘slippery nature’ of governance issues the end result of MONIT would benefit from 
a certain degree of commonality in analysis and reporting. Development of common 
checklists for interviews could be one of the first steps of the teams involved in WP-1B.  
Developing a common structure of reporting another.   
 
 
 
 
Co-ordinating innovation policy – do we know how to deal with it?  
 
This section deals with the difficulties of coordinating innovation policies.  These difficulties, 
it is argued, may be seen as emerging from two sources, partly the limitations of innovation 
system theory (1), partly from the inherent problems of policy coordination (2).  This section 
then reviews the lessons from theories of public management and policy coordination – and 
summarise these lessons in a discussion which opens up for implications for the study.  
 
 
Some reasons why complex problem solving among policy makers often run into 
problems 
 
Government agencies may act co-operatively as rational, collective actors, deciding to give 
power and resources to new, co-operative institutions, in order to solve common problems, 
like innovation policy.  However, these rational decisions may be offset by different forms of 
institutional logic (Scharpf 1988) that “creates frustration without disintegration”.  The 
decision to commit power and resources to new institutions to solve common problems may 
be limited by well-known considerations of self-interest, restricting the field of co-operation, 
weakening co-operative institutions, and – in a worst-case scenario, transforming them into 
rhetoric with no or limited practical impact on the problem.  The solution to the common 
problem may be found in the available arsenal of dominant institutions, thus resulting in 
institutional diffusion.  As we all know, these processes of diffusion and mimicking may 
prove to be inadequate, given the complexity of the problem at hand (DiMaggio & Powell, 
1983).  Thus, institutional logic may offset rational action on all these phases, the field of co-
operation may be deprived of adequate resources and powers of allocation, the solution to the 
problem may be found in some dominant model which does not apply very well to the actual 
problem at hand – and the field may be fragmented, because the institutions are too weak to 
be able to perform the dance of mutual adaptation.     
 
Lessons from theories of public management and policy co-ordination 
 
In the last two decades there are two conspicuous international trends with respect to 
government: the internationalisation of governance and public management reform. The 
domestic reforms, on the one hand, are mainly motivated by a desire to curb publics spending. 
A transfer of tasks from the public to the private sector, often called a rolling back of the state, 
is a widespread strategy in trimming public budgets. The internationalisation of governance 
is, on the other hand, a reaction to increasing global interdependence (Metcalfe 1994). The 
establishing of EU institutions and other supranational bodies means a multiplying of 
involved institutions and political processes in the shaping and implementation of policy 
(Sand 1998). As several authors have argued, there are strong dependencies between state 
capabilities in the international context on the one hand, and the management and coherence 
of domestic policy on the other (e.g. Katzenstein 1985; Putnam 1988). The entanglement of 
the domestic and the international levels suggests that domestic developments will have 
repercussions on state capabilities internationally.  
 
A key task in the making and implementation of broad, coherent policies both on the domestic 
and the international level is the co-ordination of policy complexes and processes.  
 
Co-ordination 
 
What does the term co-ordination mean in the context of modern government?  From a 
systemic point of view it means that the parts of the system “work together more effectively, 
more smoothly or more harmoniously than if no co-ordination took place” (Metcalfe 1994: 
278). The drive for stronger integration of policy, often implying the joint efforts of a number 
of ministries and other state and non-state agencies, makes governmental co-ordination and 
governance in general an increasingly difficult task. In the classical Weberian bureaucracy co-
ordination is ideally done through fixed relationships among positions in a hierarchy with 
strong central control, not being reliant on more informal interpersonal networks. At the other 
end of the scale, co-ordination can be conceived of as a process of voluntary co-operation 
among more flexibly bound individuals and organisations without a intervening central co-
ordinator (Metcalfe 1994: 279).  
 
Most of the literature on co-ordination has the single organisation as a frame of reference. 
Having modern government in mind, it makes less sense taking on this point of view. The 
involvement of both public and private partners as well as quasi-governmental organisations 
in constituting broad-based policy calls for an interpretation of governmental co-ordination 
within an expanded framework. This position is reinforced by the varying degree of 
interdependence to be found between the parts involved. Governmental co-ordination 
involves co-existing “spheres” of both high and low interdependence, where differing 
mandates to a certain degree also determine the level of interdependence within and between 
these “spheres”.  
 
A pragmatic position is to adopt a principle where the co-ordination model is repeatedly re-
tailored to fit new circumstances:  
 
“If co-ordination is a response to interdependence and provides the means of managing 
interdependence then the amount and form of co-ordination capacity should be related to the 
needs that arise in particular circumstances. Where there is limited interdependence, simple 
co-ordination capacities should suffice. Where the activities of several ministries are closely 
interdependent more sophisticated and complex co-ordination capacities are needed 
(Metcalfe 1994: 279)”            
 
This principle may indeed be useful when it comes to handling transitory needs of co-
ordinating capacity. As an organisational principle on which to create a more persistent basis 
for bureaucracy, it may however be inadequate.  
  
Relatively early insights from network theory argue the importance of weak linkages in co-
ordination of individuals and institutions not subject to hierarchies or any central co-
ordinating agency. Strength of linkages being interpreted as a function of the time spent 
together, emotional intensity, intimacy, and the degree of reciprocity characterising the 
relations. The importance of the weak linkages derives from the assumption that groups 
characterised only by strong ties insulate these groups from inducement external to the group. 
Weak linkages, i.e. personal, although not strong bonds, can function as “bridges” between 
the more socially cohesive groups. Thus creating the necessary condition for co-ordinated 
action among these groups (Granovetter 1975). As such, these insights from network theory 
adheres to the loose interpretation of co-ordination mention above, an interpretation that 
seems highly relevant for co-ordination in the compounded landscape of modern government.      
 
New Public Management  
 
Together with the economic crisis of the 1970’s new theoretical trends paved way for the 
liberalization of public sector. It was argued that the welfare state had distorted the necessary 
incentive structures of the public sector (government failure). The ‘modernization’ program 
was thus motivated both from political developments and new theoretical trends with public 
sector implications. 
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New public management (NPM) is the name that became attached to the program of reforms 
in public sector. It is not really a unitary program; it is a number of reforms, where the 
makeup and speed of implementation varies across countries. NPM is a collective term for a 
number of reforms and techniques inspired from private sector practices and economic 
rationales. Klausen (2001) sorts the main components of NPM into two main clusters: One 
concerning liberalisation of public sector based on economic arguments, the other concerning 
the application of new organisation- and management principles in public sector. The 
economic initiative centres around subjects like: privatisation, competitive tendering and 
contracting, unrestricted consumer choice, performance-related salaries, etc., while the 
organisational/management initiative centres on entrepreneurial- and strategic management, 
team management, management by objectives, new systems for budgeting and accounting, 
etc.  
 
 
Co-ordination through the market 
 
The "New Institutionalist Schools" has played an especially important role in supplying the 
theoretical rationale to the reforms of New Public Management.  This is a collection of 
schools of thought that seek to explain political, historical, economic and social institutions.   
 
 
 New institutional economics and the cost of transactions 
  
New institutional economics, originated with Willamson (1975), is a theoretical trend that 
provides a set of economic arguments to interpret organisational form. Within this tradition 
the central question at the outset was: under what conditions are economic functions 
performed within the hierarchies of firms rather than through market processes?  The answer, 
offered, was that the organisational form chosen was the one that most efficiently dealt with 
the costs of economic transactions. Reoccurring transactions characterised by ambiguity and 
substantial “transaction-specific investments” is, according to this tradition, more likely to 
take place within the hierarchies of firms rather than between firms in a market interface. 
Non-repetitive, simple transactions, requiring no transaction-specific investments, would 
more likely be organised through market processes (Granovetter 1985). 
 
An example of what could be counted as a simple transaction, although certainly being 
repetitive, is the municipal waste management. In many cases has this service been 
subcontracted out to private companies under the assumption that the service can be provided 
for less cost when transferred to the private domain. The rationale being that this service is so 
simple, needing small transaction-specific investments, thus being more efficiently produced 
over a market interface than by the municipality itself. And when this logic is applied in 
general the result will be a distribution of tasks between the public and private domain that 
minimises the total production- and transaction costs.      
 
The co-ordination of the transactions will normally be done through three forms of contractual 
agreements: Market contracts regulating the buying and selling of well-defined goods and 
services in a market, price being the most important co-ordinating factor. Relational 
contracts, also called network-relations, come into being when the delivery can not be fully 
specified, and consist of informal agreements and unwritten codes of conduct. Trust being the 
most important co-ordinating factor under such conditions. Finally, there are hierarchical 
contracts (contracts of employment) functioning mainly within firms (or other organisations), 
authority being the most important co-ordinating mechanism (Busch 2001: 85).  
 
The relational contract is especially relevant when there is high transaction specific 
investments, i.e. when there is high uncertainty concerning the complete nature of the 
delivery. Writing effective market contracts can be impractical in such situations. Within 
firms, incentives like higher salary and promotion is based on performance in teamwork, 
leadership, and personal initiative. These are aspects of occupational behaviour that are 
difficult to positively verify in any other way than through the personal opinion of the 
employer and colleges. Both the employee and the employer recognise this without codifying 
the details in a contract. The employers’ incentive in following up on these relational 
contracts is their labour market reputation (Levin 2003). 
 
The same logic also applies to the relational contracts often supplementing the market 
contracts between firms. In the transactions of firms it is often a need for a level of flexibility 
that goes beyond contractual agreements. A trust based give- and take relationship permits 
flexible co-ordination and keeps the firms out of court when the circumstances require more 
than what is specified in the market contract.       
 
“A relational contract thus allows the parties to utilize their detailed knowledge of 
their specific situation and to adapt to new information as it becomes available. For the 
same reasons, however, relational contracts cannot be enforced by a third party 
and so must be self-enforcing: the value of the future relationship must be sufficiently 
large that neither party wishes to renege” (Baker, et al. 2002: 40). 
 
The contribution of the New Institutional Economics and transaction cost theory with respect 
to NPM is that it supplied some criteria for when to expect that public services could be 
produced more effectively in the private market than within the hierarchy of bureaucracy 
itself. A question in MONIT is the extent to which the notion of relational contracting can 
serve as a useful concept for the understanding of the social mechanisms for the relationships 
within policy systems that have a bearing on co-ordination and generation of policy 
coherence. 
 Public Choice  
 
Public choice theory is devoted to studying politics based on economic principles. In the 
seminal work of Buchanan and Tullock (1962) they hold that one can understand the 
behaviour of public servants in much the same way as actors in the private market: as utility 
maximising individuals.  
 
“Men co-operate through exchange of goods and services in organized markets, and 
such co-operation implies mutual gain. The individual enters into an exchange 
relationship in which he furthers his own interest by providing some product or service 
that is of direct benefit to the individual on the other side of the transaction. At base, 
political or collective action under the individualistic view of the State is much the 
same. Two or more individuals find it mutually advantageous to join forces to 
accomplish certain common purposes. In a very real sense, they "exchange" inputs in 
the securing of the commonly shared output. (Buchanan and Tullock 1962: pt. 1, ch. 
3).  
 
The theory of the bureaucrat is the part of the public choice tradition that has exerted the 
heaviest influenced on the NPM movement (Busch 2001). Especially Niskanen (1971;1973) 
has been influential. He argues that the self-interest of the individual is not a problem in the 
private sector because maximisation of profits is what serves both the individual and the firm 
best. This is, however, not necessarily the case in the public sector. The problem is that the 
bureaucrat, being no different from other people, maximises his or her own self-interest, and 
this is done through the maximisation of the agency’s budget. By doing this the bureaucrat is 
rewarded with increase in salary, power and improved promotional prospects.  
 
This government failure is made possible because the costs and benefits of the work of the 
bureaucrat are hard to evaluate. The information required to evaluate the costs and benefits of 
public goods are not as readily available to the politicians as to the bureaucrats producing the 
collective good. Hence, the beureucrats have a considerable advantage in arguing budget 
increases, and in doing so maximises their own rather than the society’s utility.  
 
Obviously the utility-maximising bureaucrat can pose a problem for the co-ordination of a 
horizontal policy. Horizontal policies require the reconciliation of multiple interests and the 
co-operation of possibly several state and non-state agencies. If bureaucrats maximise the 
budgets of their own bureaus, at the expense of other participants in a co-operative 
relationship, this could lead to mis-allocation of resources in the formulation and 
implementation of broad policies. Still, there is a mechanism, within the logic of economic 
man, which can keep check on such unproductive opportunism and that is if the task or 
“transaction” has the nature of a sequential or repeated game. From the game of prisoner’s 
dilemma it is known that sequential or repeated games let players develop an understanding of 
the games complexities. This leads to self-constraining behaviour, co-ordination and in the 
end: higher benefits for all the players (Hovi and Rasch 1993). In other words – longer 
relationships lead to the possibility of trusting behaviour.             
 
The main contribution of the public choice literature with respect to the development of 
NPM-reforms has been to heighten the awareness of opportunistic behaviour resulting in 
oversupply of public goods in the public sector (Busch 2001).      
 Principal-agent  
 
The principal-agent model has been an important input to the study of public choice. An 
example of this is Niskanens description of the utility maximising bureaucrat, which is based 
on this model. But the relevance of principal-agent models goes beyond public choice theory. 
It is an general analytic expression of the relationship between a principal and an agent, “in 
which one party, the principal, considers entering into a contractual agreement with another, 
the agent, in the expectation that the agent will subsequently choose actions that produce 
outcomes desired by the principal”(Moe 1984: 756).   
 
The problem in the pincipal-agent relation is twofold. First there is a problem of choice of 
agent. Because the principal is unable to observe the information, beliefs and values the 
agents actions are based on, it is difficult for the principal to select the best agent to do the 
“job” (adverse selection). Second, once an agent is hired, it is difficult for the principal to 
monitor the job actually being done by the agent (moral hazard).  
 
The core of the problem lies with the incentive structure. The information on the motives and 
actions of the agents is imperfect and skewed in favour of the agent. It is this unevenness in 
access to information (information asymmetry) that leads to adverse selection and moral 
hazard. With moral hazard the agent has an incentive to act in a way that promotes his or her 
utility but detracts from that of the principal (cf. Niskanens bureaucrat). In order to mitigate 
the information asymmetry the principal would want to set up a monitoring system as well as 
create incentives for the agent to disclose as much of his or her privately held information as 
possible (Moe 1984: 756).  
 
 The whole state administration is structured as a chain of principal-agent relationships, the 
ultimate principal in democracies being the citizens, with politicians as their agents. On the 
next tier the politicians are the principals, bureaucrats being their agents. This dual principal-
agent relationship manifests itself all the way down through the bureaucracy, ending with the 
lowest-level bureaucrats providing direct service to the citizens (Moe 1984). A strategy to 
overcome the moral hazard problem of the principal-agent relationships in the public sector is 
to pre-define measurable ends to policies, giving the public and politicians the opportunity to 
assess the achievement of civil servants vis-à-vis such standards (Broadbent, et al. 1997). The 
issuing of political guarantees and development of measurable policy-indicators15 (e.g. 
waiting list guarantees for hospital treatment in Norway) is an example of this.   
 
Co-ordination through public management 
 
During the 1980’s and 90’s there was a transfer of managerial techniques and models from the 
private to the public sector, but the development of management thought in general traces 
back to Frederick Winslow Taylor. He argued that management could be a ‘true science’ and 
that the laws discovered is universally applicable – all human behaviour is subject to these 
laws - and consequently, anything can, and should, be managed. Taylorism stood for 
determination and fixation of efforts in the workplace production process and the 
bureaucratization of the structure of control and the de-bureaucratization of employment 
relationships (Pollitt 1993). The impact of these and later managerial principles was initially 
restricted to organizations of the private sector, but has, as we have learned, in later years also 
largely influenced the practices of public sector organization and administration. This 
development has to be seen in relation to the development of the ‘economics’ of 
organizational form and employer-employee behaviour (cf. transaction-costs theory, public 
choice theory, the principal-agent model).   
 
Market contracts instead of hierarchical contracts 
 
A fundamental public sector development following neo-Taylorian principles is the 
replacement of hierarchical contracts with market contracts as co-ordinating mechanism. This 
is realised partly by pushing for focused and specialized units that offer a limited number of 
services, services that are offered in quasi-market arrangements within the public sector, with 
clear separation between contractor and provider, between buyer and seller (Vanebo 2001). 
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Thus a market-based financing of public organisations becomes a supplement or alternative to 
the traditional budget-financing, and in line with the creation of more economically 
autonomous units in public sector, more is expected of head of departments etc. with respect 
to economic control and reporting.  
 
Another expression of the substitution of hierarchical contracts with market contracts is the 
shift from the state as the monopolist provider of public services, all public services being 
produced within the public sector, to the use of private providers of public services. Use of 
outsourcing is an example of this, but also state support of private institutions (schools, 
hospitals, nursing homes, etc), and the privatization of state owned companies (like railways, 
telephone providers and electrical plants).             
 
Accountability 
 
The lack of state control in the production of public services (principal-agent accountability 
problems) is a hot topic also within the management literature. One of the concerns is that 
with the ‘hollowing out of the state’16 and the loss of the day to day administration of public 
services government also looses the ability to govern. The argument levelled against this 
critique is that it is better to “steer rather than row”. The responsibility of the public is not to 
produce, but to know what to contract, who to contract, and post production, be able to 
evaluate what is purchased (Greve and Ejersbo 2001). An alternative, to clean-cut 
outsourcing, which let government retain a higher degree of control in the production, is 
public/private partnerships. Especially within the area of research and development is the use 
of public/private partnerships getting more frequent.  
 
“In the area of technology policy, the term “public/private partnership” can be defined as any 
innovation-based relationship whereby public and private actors jointly contribute financial, 
research, human and infrastructure resources, either directly or in kind” (OECD 1999). 
 
Ensuring a larger degree or public control is a benefit additional to the “official” rationale for 
promoting such partnerships which relates to i) the traditional correction of an undersupply in 
the market (of R&D), and ii) improving the efficiency of public support (for R&D) (ibid.).  
 
Collaborations between both public and private actors and between private service providers 
are seen as strategies in creating better and more effective public services than what could be 
achieved through traditional hierarchies. The major task of modern government thus becomes 
to administer networks rather than hierarchies. Efficient network administration is 
accomplished by the integration of interdependent providers in such a way that a continuous 
and consistent array of services is created. In the world of competitive contracting network 
administration would consist of writing, negotiation, monitoring and enforcing contracts 
among a number of providers (Milward and Provan 2003). There is, however, an implicit 
inconsistency in the wish for both collaborative arrangements and competitive contracting. 
This relates to the assumption that competition depresses collaboration and thwarts 
performance. The answer would seem to be to create incentives for cooperation in the 
contracts. Still-there are indications that efforts to create competition between service 
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providers has led to instability in the level and quality of the services provided. In a study of 
mental health services in the U.S.  Milward and Provan (ibid.) finds that frequent rebidding of 
contracts does not promote effectiveness in markets with few sellers of services (thin 
markets).  
 
“By relaxing the part of the contract that calls for competition, we believe that there 
can be relatively large gains in performance at the service delivery level. Infrequent 
rebidding of the contract to govern a system of services encourages trust, collaboration 
and long term investments in a network’s infrastructure” (Milward and Provan 2003: 
16).       
 
Their recommendations is in accordance with the insights from game theory that states that 
when games are sequential (reoccurring over time) the players are more able to incorporate 
the full information of the game, creating trusting relationships, preventing unproductive 
opportunism.   
  
A critique 
 
A critique of the introduction of market-based solutions in the public sector is that the 
conditions for their successful application are not in accordance with the real life 
field/landscape of public administration. Defining sets of clear, mutually compatible 
objectives, translating these into operational targets, selecting the resources to implement 
these, and finally monitoring the implementation itself is unrealistic in a public-policy setting. 
“What is absolutely clear, however, is that clear and limited objectives, stable and explicit 
priorities (etc.) are very seldom the experienced reality of public-service organizations (Pollitt 
1993: 120-121). And this is the result of reasoning that is built on “political rather than 
economic ‘rationality’; emotional or psychological logic rather than the textbook utalitaran 
kind” (ibid.). Clear formulation of objectives is eschewed because of politicians need to build 
and maintain coalitions of support and because broadly-stated objectives are in less danger of 
being a ‘hostage to fortune’ (Pollitt 1993).  
 
A cluster of public-sector studies and theories that is more oriented towards the complexities 
in the empirical field of government is those being associated with ‘public governance’.     
       
Publice governance 
 
The governance-perspective surfaced at about the same time as NPM. The term ‘governance’ 
has in this perspective taken on a slightly different meaning than just a synonym for 
government. “Governance signifies a change in the meaning of government, referring to a 
new process of governing; or a changed condition of ordered rule; or the new method by 
which society is governed” (Rhodes 1997: 46) 
 
This perspective tries to come to grips with the intricacies in the governing of modern 
societies. It tries to incorporate the implications of the complexity, dynamics and diversity of 
socio-political systems. It focuses on the development of governing styles that blur the 
boundaries between the public and private sector. It takes interest in the limitations of one-
directional public management and the potential in more co-operative approaches. According 
to Kooiman (1993: 35) there is developed a ‘third way’ of governing that shifts the modus 
operandi from unilateral to ‘interactionist’, this being a response to the lacking capacity of the 
‘old’ political and administrative structures. Public management, within the governance 
perspective, is the co-ordination of-, and the collaboration with complex networks consisting 
of many different interdependent actors: local-, regional-, national- and international 
government; other political groups and interest organisations; private businesses and other 
private organisations. The practice of management is rather than an ‘imposing of will’ more in 
line with guidance:  
 
“The management of such public networks is a form of external government ‘steering’, 
steering having a broader meaning than strict administrative control but being broadly defined 
as ‘directed influencing’. Public management is the directed influencing of societal processes 
in a complex network of many other co-directing actors. These actors have different and 
sometimes conflicting objectives and interests. Government is not the single dominating actor 
which can unilaterally impose its will” (Kickert 1997: 33).     
 
Clearly, governance involves a networks approach to the interpretation of policy institutions, -
actors and -processes. Emphasis is on how networks are structures that constrain and facilitate 
action, with cultures that constrain or facilitate action; how networks define the roles of its 
members, define salient issues and tasks; have sets of embedded rules and practices that 
ensure sufficient cohesion to maintain the network. 
 
“Networks involve the institutionalization of beliefs, values, cultures and particular 
forms of behaviour. They are organizations which shape attitudes and behaviour. 
Networks result from repeated behaviour and, consequently, they relieve decision 
makers of taking difficult decisions; they routinize behaviour. They simplify the policy 
process by limiting actions, problems and solutions. Networks define roles and 
responses. In doing so they are not neutral, but, like other political institutions and 
processes, they both reflect past power distributions and conflicts and shape present 
policy outcomes” (Marsh and Smith 2000: 6).  
 
Kickert (1997) claims it is an empirical fact that government occupy a special role in the 
policy networks, unlike that of the others, not implying top-down control, but rather that total 
horizontality and autonomy of actors in public sector networks are unrealistic, and that this 
places the concept of network governance between the extremes of hierarchy and market.     
 
Inter-dependency 
 
The relationships among the actors involved public policy networks are characterized by a 
social exchange which include negotiations, applying leverage, compromising, playing 
various forms of tactical games, etc. This implies that the actors committed to collective 
action are dependent on each other; they have to exchange resources and negotiate common 
purposes in order to achieve their goals; and the outcome is not only dependent on the 
recourses, but also what games are played and the context of exchange (Stoker 1998).    
 
So even though government plays a special role in public policy networks, and would want to 
take control over an exchange, this is not easily accomplished because of the dependence on 
acquiescence and the actions of the other partners. The limitations of any single entity’s 
capacity ensure mutual dependence. In formulating and implementing horizontal policy, no 
single actor has the knowledge and recourses to run such processes unliterary, so the 
exchange will inevitably be an interactive one, between interdependent actors (ibid.). 
 
Rhodes (1997) identifies five different types of policy networks with varying degree of 
horizontal and vertical articulation and interdependence. The weakest form of policy networks 
(with respect to social and structural cohesion) is the issue networks, characterized by 
unstableness, large member groups and limited vertical interdependence. The strongest is the 
professional networks and the policy communities characterised by stability, restricted 
membership, vertical interdependence and limited horizontal articulation. (more on the five 
types in here).     
 
Depending on the type of policy networks, they will display different forms of partnerships 
among its members. The relations could be of a principal-agent form, an inter-organizational 
negotiation form, or a systemic co-ordination form. The inter-organizational negotiation 
involves, as the name indicate, the negotiation of joint projects between organizations. Such 
partnerships come into being because the pooling of resources makes it easier for the 
participants to reach the objectives of their own organizations. The systemic co-ordination 
represents an even more integrated form of partnership because the participants develop a 
shared vision in addition to the joint working capacity, resulting in the creation of self-
organizing networks (Stoker 1998).          
 
Self-organizing networks and accountability 
 
Within the governance paradigm self-organizing networks (i.e. autonomous self-governing 
networks) is not restricted to influencing policy; the act of governing is actually the co-
ordination of self-organizing networks17. Since self organizing networks is a blend of various 
forms of relationships (hierarchical contracts, market contracts, relational contracts) the co-
ordination and co-operation within these networks is potentially hampered by the same 
accountability problems identified in the public choice and principal-agent literature. Because 
of the interdependence between the members of the network, rules of conduct and control 
mechanisms are, rather than chosen and adopted by central government, a subject of 
negotiation. It is ‘games about rule’ rather than ‘games under rule’ (Stoker 1998). So there 
can also be an accountability deficit because of dissatisfaction with the network arrangements 
among the members of the constituent groups and a lack of channels to efficiently voice the 
dissatisfaction. And, as self-organizing networks is especially restrictive with respect to 
membership, there is an accountability problem in the exclusion of some interests groups.  
 
Government 
 
                                                          
17 Stoker (1998) notes that in other branches within political science studies the concept of regimes relates 
closely to the concept of  self-organizing networks. In urban politics the concept of regime usually refers to a 
formation of elite actors drawn from public and private sectors, defined as “an informal yet relatively stable 
group with access to institutional resources that enable it to have a sustained role in making governing decisions” 
(Stone 1989: 4 cited in Stoker 1998:23). In international relations studies the concept of regimes is used to 
describe how self-governing networks are formed to manage common interest among participating states.        
 
A solution to the accountability problem would be to bring government in some form back 
into the discussion (Kickert 1997; Stoker 1998). Kooiman (1993) argues that as the structure 
and processes of modern society is growing ever more complex, the option to govern from a 
single point is not very viable. So the concept of the omnipotent, unilaterally intervening state 
has lost its attractiveness. A new ‘light touch’ form of government does not, however, 
necessarily imply a ‘hands off’ policy. “The task of governments in contemporary, complex 
societies is to influence social interactions in such a way that that political governing and 
social self-organisation are made complementary” (Kooiman 1993: 256). The following 
points are suggested as a classification of general tasks in the governing of modern societies 
(Kooiman 1993):      
 
- coordination and composition; 
- steering and collibration; 
- regulation and intergration.  
 
This is Stokers (1998) interpretation of these tasks:  
 
“The first task involves defining a situation, identifying key stakeholders and then 
developing effective linkages between the relevant parties. The second is concerned 
with influencing and steering relationships in order to achieve desired outcomes. The 
third is about what others call ‘system management’ (Stewart, 1996). It involves 
thinking and acting beyond the individual sub-systems, avoiding unwanted side effects 
and establishing mechanisms for effective co-ordination” (Stoker 1998: 24).  
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APPENDIX I:  What are the tools for increasing coherence? 
 
OECD countries have employed a number of structural and procedural mechanisms for 
strengthening coherence. These mechanisms are necessary for setting priorities, co-ordinating 
policy and developing formal and informal information and communication networks based 
on a common understanding of the benefits of government coherence: 
 
Setting priorities and strategic planning 
• A collective priority-setting exercise provides the head of government with an 
opportunity to build coherence. The Centre can support that exercise by leading a 
planning process designed to co-ordinate ministerial priorities, reconcile any conflicts, and 
seek a balance that will mesh sectoral priorities and the government's main policy goals 
into a coherent programme.  
 
• Existing mechanisms such as the budget and regulation processes can be harnessed to 
help set priorities. The budgetary process is a particularly powerful tool of coherence. The 
budget affects all sectors of activity, provides a cyclical opportunity to set political and 
strategic directions for the future, and plays a determining role in the definition of the 
government's economic and other policy priorities.  
 
Co-ordinating structures and instances 
• Permanent co-ordination structures may be needed in fields where policies are 
intrinsically cross-sectoral. Permanent structures also help ensure that the country's 
foreign and domestic interests are fully integrated and coherently presented in 
international fora. 
 
• Information flows between ministries can also be enhanced through formal, but less 
permanent mechanisms such as consultative or co-ordinating committees, organised 
around issues rather than around permanent functions. Working at various levels of the 
administration, such structures help build networks of officials and “policy communities”, 
which can be widened by creating overlapping networks of committees (obtained by 
cross-membership). Such bodies can more easily cross ministerial and/or policy 
boundaries.  
 
• Temporary structures such as task forces, created on an “as-needed” basis, provide 
flexibility and responsiveness and are less likely to outlive their usefulness. 
 
• Centres of government can also recognise the role of civil society in strengthening 
coherence by creating forums to represent the interests of relevant actors from outside 
government. Advisory committee can help bring to light some cross-cutting aspects of 
policies that might otherwise have remained hidden.  
 
• Plenary debates in parliament are themselves an occasion on which to review proposed 
legislation for their coherence with existing measures within a particular sector as well as 
with overall policy goals. Several parliaments have adopted procedures which can 
potentially reinforce parliament’s capacity to monitor policy coherence.  
 
• In many countries, the concern for coherence has produced a conflict resolution system 
which ensures that contentious issues move up the different levels of the hierarchy toward 
arbitration, either by a special body, such as a coalition council or a select committee of 
ministers, or by the head of government, with whom rests the ultimate responsibility. The 
role of the Centre then is to ensure that the contentious issues are clearly defined, that the 
interests at stake are identified, and that the head of government has in hand all the 
elements required to manage the conflict. Dealing with policy conflicts in a non-
systematic way increases the risks of confusion and incoherence. 
 
The role of public actors in strengthening coherence 
Centres of government need to develop a network of partners both throughout and outside 
government to assist in the strengthening of government coherence. 
 
• The council of ministers is an important locus for the management of cross-cutting policy 
issues: all the main actors in policy making and service provision are represented. The 
challenge is to strengthen the capacity of the council to deal with cross-cutting issues, 
while preserving ministerial accountability. Committees of the council can also be used to 
co-ordinate defined policy fields. 
 
• Individual ministers can also be given responsibility for strengthening coherence. 
Ministers without portfolio can be charged with co-ordinating broad clusters of 
programmes that transcend institutional boundaries. Line ministers can be given additional 
responsibilities to lead cross-cutting co-ordination efforts beyond their portfolio mandate. 
Junior ministers can be mandated to co-ordinate parts of large ministries, and to ensure a 
more holistic co-ordination of services to designated client groups.  
 
• The budget ministry exercises broad co-ordination functions, stemming from its 
responsibility to integrate a wide range of policy objectives in the budget, and to ensure 
that the budget provides an accurate fiscal reflection of the government's overall order of 
priorities. This strategic role can be adapted to incorporate a coherence building function. 
 
Governments use a variety of mechanisms to direct and co-ordinate the preparation of 
budgets and to control incremental costs associated with policy development outside the 
budget process. Some systems emphasise bilateral negotiations between the budget 
ministry and line ministries, with less direct involvement of the Centre. In others (e.g. in 
systems where a tradition of budget secrecy prevails), the budget ministry might not go 
beyond informal consultations with line ministries before finalising the budget in 
collaboration with the Centre. What is essential is that there be mechanisms in place that 
enable the Centre to integrate expenditure control objectives in the government's overall 
programme. 
 
• Senior civil servants should also be utilised to enhance co-ordination and strengthen the 
system's capacity to identify and manage cross-cutting issues. The careers of key civil 
servants should be structured so that they have a broader conception of government and 
policy. Civil servants who have spent time in a variety of ministries have a better 
perception of the perspectives of other policy fields. They are more likely to understand 
the range of services delivered by government, and how they can be managed more 
coherently. 
 
• Civil society partners can be a source of incoherence as well as a partner in spotting 
signs of incoherence. In either case, their views cannot be ignored. Centres of government 
need analytical capacity in order to weigh competing claims. They also need to create 
channels of communication to provide information to civil society partners and to receive 
feedback.  
 
Building communications and information networks 
Because policy decisions are also political decisions, systems must provide for close linkage 
of the political and administrative actors. 
 
• Linkage between co-ordinating structures and the Centre can be ensured either 
through the direct participation of Centre officials in meetings, or through reporting 
mechanisms. For example, the Centre can insist, as a matter of policy, on being informed 
in advance of the agendas of meetings, and afterward of their outcomes. 
 
• Where possible, permitting some civil servants to attend ministerial-level meetings 
gives them a more direct appreciation of the views, needs and constraints of ministers, and 
an opportunity to acquire a broader perspective on the policy-making process. It also 
creates an incentive for officials to do their utmost to consult with colleagues in other 
ministries prior to ministerial meetings, to review proposals, resolve outstanding issues, 
explore compromise options, identify issues that cannot be resolved at the administrative 
level and present them for discussion by ministers. 
 
• In order to build a culture of coherence, the Centre must communicate major strategic 
concerns to the line ministries in order to create a shared sense of purpose. While 
understanding the concern for coherence will not lead line ministries to give up sectoral 
interests, it helps them to understand the oftentimes tough decisions that need to be made. 
 
